Zolana does not claim anonymity. Shielding hides amounts and counterparties from the public ledger. It does not hide your activity from the operator of the gateway you connect through.
The statement the site makes
The privacy dialog on this site (the Privacy button in the footer) is the reference wording:
Shielded details. Payment amounts and receiving addresses are protected by proofs. Your spending and viewing keys stay on your device.
Public evidence. Blocks, timing, fees, nullifiers and public deposit or withdrawal accounts and amounts remain visible.
The invited gateway knows your membership and receiving address. It sees your IP address and request timing and can link your submissions. This is not a claim of complete anonymity.
The rest of this page expands each part and points at the code and review notes behind it.
What is hidden from the public ledger
A shielded send does not contain a plaintext sender, recipient or payment amount. The recipient’s amount, the recipient and the change are carried as encrypted notes that only the wallets involved can decrypt.
The wallet’s spending and viewing keys are created and used on the device. The browser wallet keeps its wallet file, checkpoints and pending payments in the browser in encrypted form, and its core has no function that exports a raw seed, a viewing key or a decrypted note.
What is public on chain
| Public | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| That a shielded payment happened, and when | Blocks and timing are public. Every payment has the same two-action shape, which is also observable. |
| The exact fee and who received it | For a shielded-fee send, the relay’s account and the exact fee are public fields of the payment. |
| Nullifiers and commitments | Two of each per payment, stored permanently. |
| Randomized authorization keys, encrypted outputs, proof and signatures | They are part of the payment data. |
| Network identifier and expiry slot | They are part of the payment data. |
| Deposits and withdrawals | The public account and the amount are visible whenever value enters or leaves the pool. |
| A user’s public fee account | Only if user-paid fees are used: the fee account, its funding source, the fees and the timing are public. |
There is no network-layer anonymity. Nothing in the protocol hides the IP address a request comes from.
What the devnet gateway can see
The devnet wallet does not talk to validators directly. It talks to a gateway run by the project, which admits wallets, answers their reads and passes payments to a relay. The project’s own review of this path says plainly that the gateway can link member activity:
- Membership and receiving address. When a wallet joins, admission ties a stable identity derived from the wallet’s seed (its fee address) to the wallet’s private receiving address. The gateway keeps that record.
- Every request is attributed. Requests carry a signed access proof from that same identity. The proof is a session credential that stays valid for ten minutes, not a per-request signature.
- IP address and timing. The operator can observe the socket IP address and the timing and methods of requests.
- Which payments you submitted. The gateway passes the member identity to the relay, and the relay durably records which member owns each submitted job. It stores a hash of the identity, and the review notes that “hashing an identity known to the operator is not anonymous membership”.
- Its own test grants. The operator knows which wallet it funded and with how much.
What the gateway and relay do not receive, according to the same review: the wallet’s spending and viewing keys. A submitted packet contains ciphertexts and a proof. “That does not imply anonymity from the operator.”
Three further points from the review are worth knowing:
- A gateway can deny service.
- The wallet accepts any valid quoted relay account and fee under the cap it authorised, and the proof binds those public values. A malicious operator could individualise them to mark a payment. The honest configuration uses shared fixed settings; stronger unlinkability from the operator has not been implemented.
- The gateway code in the repository does not write access logs and stores a digest, not the address, for per-address rate limits. That describes the code. It is not a statement about what any particular deployment records.
What you are trusting
- The RPC endpoint. Wallets verify proofs, signatures and the continuity of the history they are given, against the endpoint they are configured with. They are not light clients and do not verify consensus independently. Finality comes from the operator’s RPC.
- The website that serves the wallet. The browser wallet is a hosted hot wallet. A compromised site could replace the wallet’s code, steal an unlocked seed or change a recipient. Building proofs locally does not protect against malicious wallet code.
- The project’s infrastructure. Every validator of the devnet is run by the project. Liveness, and the correctness of what a wallet is shown, depend on it.
What the explorer shows
The explorer shows recent blocks and transactions with their signature, slot, result and fee. It does not show shielded amounts or participants, because they are not public.
What is not claimed
- Not anonymity, and not unlinkability from the gateway operator.
- Not post-quantum protection. Ed25519 and Orchard/Halo 2 are not claimed to resist a quantum computer.
- Not privacy for assets other than the native coin. There is no bridge and there are no SOL or USDC deposits.
- Not audited security. The review this page draws on is the project’s own engineering review, “not an independent cryptographic audit”.
Source: docs/privacy-boundary.md and the “Known limits” section of the README.